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The United Party rump which entered into power in September 1939 
inherited a policy for race relations which derived directly from the Hertzog 
legislation of 1976-37, with no apparent intention of changing it. The 
Hertzog recipe was cooked in a three-legged pot: one leg was the communal 
representation of the African voters of the Cape on a separate roll; the 
secwad was the territorial segregation of Africans in their own Reserves; and 
the khird was the segregation of urban Africans and the limitation of their 
~vmnbers in accordance with the availability of work in a.ny particular town 
(essen.tially the gospel of Colonel Stallard, which Hertzog seems to have taken 
over). mere the Cape Coloured people were concerned, Hertzog's policy was in 
%he process of formation, ar,d its lines not yet rigid: his political and 
ecs~cmit: "new deal" had been a casualty of the debates of 1926-36, and although 
Giie Willcocks Commission reported in 1937, urgjag that Vie Coloured people 
merited better jobs, better trade unions, better schools, better health 
servicea an.& pensions, more opportunities for owning land and a chance to learn 
how to farm it, and even a parliamentary vote in the northerri provinces if they 
were highly qualified, no legislation followed before Hertzog fell from power. 
This was almost certainly because he was having a lot of difficulty with his 
own rank and file. Ln the case of the Indian populations of Natal and the 
Transvaal, the voluntary repatriation agreed on in Cape Town between the 
Lndiain and South African governments in 1927 had not produced the results 
anticipated by both parties, and by the mid-1930s there were signs of renewed 
pressure on the &dim community of both provinces. In the Transvaal, Asian 
l a d  rights were pegged for two years by legislation of May 1939, and the same 
ki0.d of white nervousmess which underlay this legislation had also revived in 
Natal, where the first Broome Commission was appointed in the same year to 
investigate the extent of Indian encroachment.* 
h general terms, the South African Parliament had nailed its flag 
to the mast of Segregation. Nearly all the Opposition wainted more of it rather 
than less. Hertsog stressed it, with special reference to the territorial 
factor. Smuts had stressed it in his Bh6&e lectures in 1929, as the one way 
of ensuring that tribal Africans working in white areas remained essentially 
tribal. Stallard stressed it as essential for the towns. The immense 
majorities obtained for the Representation of Natives Bill in the Joint Session 
of 1936 seemed to identify the policy with the outlook of the white community 
as a whole. 
-- - 
*For reasons of space, and because the pr- sources consulted had little to 
add, discussion of the policies of the Smuts Government towards Coloured people 
and Asians is omitted from this paper. 
If thiir wan true, the major inroads into that policy &using tha war 
yoarrj required m oxplanation. The oxplanation offered here has four main 
~.upects. First, the philosophy of segregation was always less deep-rooted, 
and more seriously questioned, than the evidence quoted above tends to suggest. 
Second, changing social and economic conditions beginning well before the fall 
of the Hertzog Government rendered influx control obsolete at about the same 
time (the late 1930s) as the Government first tried seriously to enforce it. 
Third, the policy came into discredit because of its ove*enthusiastic adoption 
by the Mala Nationalists, who had fallen into disfavour with the electorate 
for flirting too ostentatiously with Nazi Germany. And, fourth, the 
Representation of Natives Act of 1936 sent to Parliament a singularly well 
co-ordinated group of white Natives' Representatives whose influence was strong 
enough - given a Government prepared to lend an ear, above all at a time when 
African loyalty was important to 9t - to transform the debate over "native 
policy" from a discussion of control techniques to a discussion of long-term 
welfare. But, althou& Smuts" concern was for the most part deep a d  genuine, 
his grasp and timing were unsure and his attention diverted above all by the 
need to win the war. For these reasons, he seriously considered the new 
policies advocated by the small liberal pressure poup inside and outside the 
coalition, but turned away from them with excessive caution before the general 
eloction of 1943? and then only nibbled at a liberal solution under mounting 
prsrrauses from black and white radicals before the election of 1948, 
To take these points in order, the bad drafting an& the inhuman 
administration of the 1913 L a d  Act probably he2ps to explain the delay of ten 
years before the first major legislation was carried t h r o w  Parliament for 
inposing segregation on the urban areas. It also seems clear that the 
e~thusiasm of -the ideologues of segxegation in the early 1930s alienated at 
least the South African Party ra.nJs and file: Heaton Nicholls may have aroused 
opposition mainly on account of his lead in the Natal separatist movement, but 
the ideological arrogance of his Native Affairs Commission Report for 1936 
hardly made him popular, while Stallard emerges from the Smuts Papers as a 
kind of f7Eho~h Powell" among the SAP pigeons. Nor was the Department of Native 
Affairs at one over the merits of Hertzogts policies, as the suppressed Youap 
Bamett Report of 1935, with its unequivocal denunciation of the notion that 
the towns belong essentially to the whites, makes only too plain. 
Sccial and economic conditions were transformed in the 1930s as a 
result o f  the industrial boom following Havengals devaluation of the South 
African pound in December 1932. The industrial colour bar ceased to make 
economic sense when industrial growth produced a shortage of skilled labour, 
when jobs for unskilled poor whites suddenly multiplied, and when semi-skilled, 
machine-minding work in industry, for which the job reservation regulations 
made no provision, began to become available. Because it continued to make 
political. sense, however, the colour bar could not be abrogated. Instead, it 
was got round. Dilution of labour, the mixing of skilled and unskilled on the 
shop floor, grew steadily and was boosted by the war. The Government itself 
employed nearly 14,000 African and Coloured non-artisans i n  its own factories 
on jobs for which they were at least questionably eligible in October 1944. 
The Van Eck Report of 1941 had recommended this dilution of labour. The Board 
of Trade a.nd Inclustries approved in 1945 of its results. 
Nationalist attempts to keep the ideology of segregation alive axe 
easy to find in the parliamentary debates of 1938 to 1942. Perhaps the bask 
example was the debate on Dr Malanls motion in favour of segregation in 1940. 
But the Nationalists1 con-bxibution to social debate at that time contrasts 
markedly with their contribution during the session of 1943, when for the first 
time they managed to force a repudiation of the arguments of the Nativesf 
Representatives out of the Cabinet. Alamein required them to switch their 
attention from the war (on which they had wasted their breath) to the threat of 
communism and anything they chose to connect with it (on which they could get 
an attentive audience). 
The Xativest Representatives were a;n effective influence. With the 
frequent exception of the independent-minded H. M. Basner, they acted well as a 
tea. Several of them were products of the Hoernlk liberal seminar, some were 
also driven by a kind of Christian urgency which imparted a special quality to 
their appeal. Brookes was perhaps the outstanding exmaple of this, 1% was 
Mrs Ballinger who usually arranged their common strategy w ~ l e  Brookes 
concentrated his tactical efforts rather in the Native Affairs Commission. 
Together, they saw to it (in a way which Hertzog had perhaps never imagined) 
that a case for their African constituents was continuously ard accurately put. 
Witness here the volumes of constituency correspondence in the Ballinger Papers, 
the debate on Rheinallt Jonesls motion in the Senate in 1941 cornmending the 
resolutions of the Natives Representative Council to "the careful consideration 
of the Governmentff, Brookesfs contribution to the Minister of Native Affairs' 
policy debate in the Senate in 1942, and Mrs Ballinger's motion on native policy 
in 1943. 
The impact of all these influences can be measured by the change of 
o=tlook in the Department of Native Affairs. Officials were clearly more 
*,ro7nbled by the Hertzog Government's attempts to impose control over African 
;i1l_fltx into the mban areas than over either the political or the territorial 
aspects of the policy of 1936-37. This resulted from a discovery that when the 
towxls were asked in tern of the 1937 Act to report how maay redundant Africans 
they were hoi~sing the census returns were unexpectedly low. Douglas hit, 
Secretary for Native Affairs from July 1934 until March 194!j2 went though a 
typical sea,-change. With the mind of a civil servant rather than an original 
policy-maker, he defended influx control consistently t h r o w  1937 and 1938. 
He took the chair at the Pretoria municipal conference in September 1938, and in 
a speech prepared for Smuts, who opened proceedings, stressed the importance of 
influx control and explained that the Government had now taken the power to 
enforce i G  because the local authorities had failed to take the initiative 
themselves. The speech did not contain a trace of ideological doubt. Yet the 
same D. L. Smit was chairman of the Inter-Departmental Committee of 1942, whose 
Report not only dmpped all reference to influx control but concerned itself 
with the detailed welfare of urban Africans, and even advocated the abolition of 
the pass laws. A similar kind of political pilgrimage was made by Henry Fagan, 
Minister of Native Affairs in Hertzog's Government until 1939, and the author 
of a well known report which echoed %it's latter-day sentiments in 1948. 
When Smuts addressed the Institute of Race Relations in January 1942, 
confessing that the history of influx control reminded him of Dame Partingtonts 
unequal fiat with the Atlantic, he had the benefit of hindsight in knowing 
that the policy of keeping the towns white had been tried and had failed. 
African detribalization, which he had hoped to fend off when speaking at Oxford 
in 1929, was now manifestly irreversible. White trusteeship of black interests 
was now hia substitute formula. This seemed to avoid the ethical dilemma which 
the abandonment of Segregation left in its wake, by offering another kind of 
jam tomorrow - white mm1s jam, from a common pot, once he had acquired the 
taste, rather than his own stuff in a separate pot but sooner. Hofmeyr would 
know, when he gave his Hoernlk Memorial Lecture in 1945, that trusteeship had 
proved a smoke-screen; but what mattered to Smuts in 1942 was that there 
should be progress in the development of African health, housing, welfare, 
wages, before any concessions were made in the field of political rights. How 
seriously did he try to go for these things? 
For a government engaged in fighting a life-and-death war, Smutsrs - 
spent a remarkable amount of energy in hunting for the facts which would enable 
it to make sense of a victorious peace. The Industrial and Agsicultural 
Requirements Codssion (chairman: Dr H. 3. van ~ck) was appointed in 
September 1939. Following on its important third interim report (1941), Smuts 
constituted the Social and Economic Planning Council under the same chairman, 
and this body out-Beveridged Beveridge in the range of its fact-finding 
activities. 
The LntercDepartmenta.1 Conrmittee under D. L. Smit, appointed to 
examine the Social, Health and Economic Conditions of Urban Natives, though not 
under the same direction, must therefore be seen as part of a much wider 
inquiry. This Committee was prepared to commit political heresy for the sake 
of giving a new direction to "native policy". Including, as it did, top civil 
servants in the Departments of Public Health, Social Welfare and Labour, as well 
an lative Affairs, this was perhaps to be expected. Not only had it urgent 
w~d meaningful thin@ to say about pensions, health and housing, vocational 
training for Africans and their right to run businesses in urban areas, all of 
which were on llsafel'gz?ound, but it risked the statement that "without amendment 
of the law, Native Trade Unions should be registered and afforded administrative 
recognition", with all that that implied for the traditions of industrial 
conciliation since 1911. It even reached the unprecedented conclusion that 
because a "burning sense of grievance and injustice" afflicted the Africans on 
accomt of the pass laws, it would be "better to face the abolition of the pass 
laws" zather than perpetuate such a state of affairs, trusting to the retention 
of a mild curfew and the improved registration of service contracts as a means 
of preserving urban control. 
Social reforms followed, pregnant with possibilities for major social 
change and not negligible as to actual achievement. These have been described 
i n  Masgaret Ballinger's autobiograplU., and covered the fields of workmen's 
compensation, pemions, unemployment insurance, public health arnd education in 
particular. While none involved the spending of enormous swns of money, they 
nearly all broke new ground by establishing areas of public responsibility where 
this had not been acknowledged before. Moreover, they implied a degree of 
co-operation between the Cabinet and the Natives' Representatives which had not 
existed before and certainly never returned after 1948. 
The ability of the Smuts Government to turn the corner in its native 
policy and start on a new road depended on its capacity to destroy the bastions 
of the older policy, armd of these the most formidable was the pass system. The 
Natives Representative Council had attacked the pass laws from its inception, 
carrying strong resolutions every year from 1938 to 1946. W. T. Welsh, taking 
his cue from the KfiC, introduced a motion in the Senate in 1938 m&g their 
T1substantial modification s~nd simplification throeout the Union". The 
Yiinister, Pagan, would not agree, but sent the request to the Native Affairs 
Comission, who referred it in turn to one of their members, J. M. Young. 
Young took his stand on unimplemented official reports of 1920 and 1932, and 
urged the replacement of the existing jungle of pass laws by a new consolidating 
law, under which every male African over 18 would have to possess a durable 
"certificate of identification", the issue of which would be recorded in his 
province of origin. Thus Young met the objections to passes based on the 
co~plexity of the system, but not those based on their offence to dignity, or 
on their capacity for filling the jails with short-term non-criminal offenders. 
33ut questions in Parliament over the incidence of pass arrests, following on 
the Smit recommendations, led the Ministers of Justice (steyn) and Native 
Affairs (~eitz), who has also been lobbied by the African National Cong'ress, to 
declare a moratorium on arrests for pass offences in May 1942, llexcept in 
circumstances where there are reasonable gmunds for believing that the Native 
concerned has committed or is about to corrnnit some other offence of sufficient 
gravity to justify such actionfs. The instruction applied to all big urban 
centres except Cape Town. The number of pass arrests on the Rand fell 
dramatically, from 13,641 in the three-month period February to April 1942, to 
1,808 in June to August. 
Unfortunately for this experiment, the prevalence of crime on the 
Witwatersrand led the same two ministers to set up a committee of inquiry under 
the Chief Nagistrate of Johannesburg, S. H. Elliott. The statistics which this 
committee produced endorsed its own opinion that, althougb crime on the Rand was 
bad, it was not possible at that stage to draw any connection between the crime 
rate and the relaxation of pass demands by the police. What it did reveal, 
though, was apparent correlation between the relaxation of pass demands by the 
police and a decline in the number of work-seeking permits applied for by 
immigrant Africans at the municipal reception depots. They calculated, not 
unreasonably, that without rigorous enforcement of the pass laws the existing 
system of worker registration was in danger of collapsing. They feared "a 
stos6.y stream flowing into the towns without let or hindrance". The policy of 
reiax1.ng p358 demands was therefore quietly abmdoned. They were being asked 
for agaLn, its routine practice, at least by April 1943. Within a year, a nation- 
wide Anti-Pass Campaign was being organized by a special committee drawn from 
the representative African political and industrial organizations, with a good 
deal of sympathetic outside help. 
As noted, 1943 was the year in which the Afrikaner Nationalist 
counter-attack begm to be effective, and it started in Parliament as the two 
sides squared up for the general election. In the Assembly, Malan moved his 
highly eclectic social security motion on 19 January, steering a course which he 
claimed would be unpalatable both to Nazis and to Communists, attacking the 
Social and Economic Planning Council as "neither representative nor competentv1, 
and seeking to reassert segregationist ideas while at the sane time identifying 
himself with the current interest in general social welfare. A week later, 
&ic Louw asked Yne House to deplore the spread of comrnunisna, which produced 
heated exchanges and had obvious electioneering value. lbs Ballinger~s 
counte>attack, in the form of a motion urging a new beg'imdng in native policy, 
consisted largely of an attempt to urge the adoption of the Smit Report; but 
the new Minister of Native Affairs, Major P, van der Byl, who had only just 
taken over from Deneys Reitz, went on to the defensive and moved as an amendment 
that the House was "satisfied that the Government has made and is making every 
endeavour to carry out the Native Policy envisaged in the 1936-57 legislation 
and it endorses the policy of the Government to make provision for improved 
health, housing, education and other social services for the Non-European 
population": cautious electioneering stuff from a man who had no difficulty in 
providing it. Brookes had a similar experience in the Senate, but whereas 
Margaret Ballinger had spoken urgently and belligerently on behalf of radical 
social change, Brookes preferred gentle persuasion and accepted an amendment by 
Senator Clarkson, Minister of Posts and Telegsaphs, expressing confidence that 
the Government would act in those situations where the W t  Report had shown 
that action was urgent. He seems to have been anxious to avoid a collision with 
the United Party, for fear of losing all power to influence its majority. 
By winning the 1943 election, the UP coalition won a breathing space 
and, as already noted, made some progress in implementing its policies regarding 
African pensions and education. But its pitch was queered by two major problems 
which were probably beyond the power of any @vernment at that time to control, 
but which, coming on top of the Governmentts cuatious mood at the time of the 
election, helped to increase black frustrations and encoucrage African,Coloured 
and Indian leaders to move closer to each other politically, and work together 
far political, territorial and industrial rights and for the removal, of the pass 
laws. One of these was the famine in the Reserves, which endured from mid-1945 
to mid-1946, and undoubtedly stimulated migmtion to the towns. The other was 
the housing crisis in the big centres. 
Johannesburg@ S African population increased by 68% between 1936 and 
1946, from 229,000 to 384,000. The Johannesburg city council had started a 
policy of clearing asld rehousing slum dwellers in the early 1 9 3 0 ~ ~  established 
Orlando township for Africans, and soon built more houses in its locations than 
it could persuade Africans living in "whitett suburbs to occupy. There were 
1,105 vacant municipal houses in Orlando and Western Native Township in 1934, 
and still 3x2 in 1937. But thereafter the increased population pressure filled 
the vacant houses and began to create a shortage just at a time when the war 
prevented further building. By 1947 the housing shortage had risen to 16,195. 
The Government carried emergency legislation t h r o w  Parliament, taking the 
power it needed to deal with the emergency in the big cities, but no law could 
get round the shortage of building materials. 
The African squatter movements of: 1946-47 arose out of this 
situation, when a new and enterprising leadership emerged in the townships 
under men such as Jaanes Sofasonke Mpanza. M p a a  provided his own local 
authority, the "Sofassonkotl ("together we shall die") Party, which squatters 
had to join, paying 2s.6d. membership and 2s.6d. weekly to cover Mlnning costs. 
He provided hessian for shanties, employed camp guards to prevent looting, 
sold trading rights to shopkeepers, and levied tolls on traders entering the 
camp. Be looked to Johannesburg Municipality to provide water and sanitaxy 
services, which Johannesburg had to do. In March 1947, the Government a d  the 
angry city council agreed to establish an emergency camp at Moroka, which was 
opened in June. A triumph for Mpanza's dedicated leadership, the episode 
nevertheless left a bitter legacy, above all between the Africans and the police, 
which eventually led to the riots of August 1947, clima2: of a series of 
confrpntations between urban Africans and the executive arm of white authority 
which had in recent years produced violence at V'ereeniging in September 1937, 
at Mabstad in December 1942, in Sophiatown in October 1944, and at Springs 
in July 1945. 
Discontent on the industrial front came to the boil at about the same 
time as the discontent over housing. D. Gosani, secretaqy of the Council of 
Non-European Trade Unions, told A. B. Xuma, President General of the ANC, in 
January 1946 that there were then well over a hundred African unions in being, 
with a total enrolment of over 150,000 spread through the mufacturing, iron 
and steel, brick and tile, building, chemical, and explosives industries, the 
commercial and distributive trades, the railwws aYld municipal services. In the 
six months ending on 31 December 1942, there were 22 strikes involving Africans 
alone, and in most of these cases, despite the prohibitions of the statute book 
and of War Measure 145, the strikers received satisfaction in return for going 
back to work. At the end of 1943 the African workers on the Victoria Falls 
power installations on the Rand came out; African troops were used to break the 
strike, but it ended with a negotiated settlement under the auspices of the 
Lansdown Commission, which had been set up to review a wage dispute on the gold 
mines as well. The facts seemed to indicate that, law or no law against black 
initustrial action, Africans knew how to organize and that it paid them to do 
so. The question of their recognition, however, remained. Primed by the NRC, 
h s  Ballinger pressed for it in the Assembly in 1939 and 1942. The proposal 
even received a fleeting but eventually negative response from Ma.deley, the 
Mjnister of Labour, in 1942. This was enough to excite Gosani, and 
momentarily even Xuma, for the Smit Committee had also wanted unofficial 
meetings to be allowed between African union leaders asld government 
representatives, so that %he industrial councils (the legal conciliation 
bodies) could be brought under indirect pressure. The Lansdom Commission, 
reporting in 1944, marked out the limits to which the Smuts Government was 
prepared to in all inportant respects. It accepted the recognition of 
African unions in principle. But it made an exception in the case of the gold 
miners, who had established a union in August 1941, on the ground that Itno 
novement ... has emanated f ~ o m  the mine native labourers themselves", and 
because the Chamber of Mines feared its exposure to communist influence, The 
Commission looked rather to the appointment of suitable welfare officers under 
the control of the Department of Native Affairs, "whose duty it would be to 
mow about regularly amongst the mineworkers; to hold at convenient times 
1neerling3;a with them or their chosen representativestt, so that their "collective 
voice . . . might find expression", and then report matters of concern to the 
workers to the Department and to the mine managements. This was similar to the 
pmpooals of the Smit Committee, a bid to achieve informally what the electorate 
wuuLd ;lot bve allowed in any formal sense; it was also the approach adopted 
by the j?3aationalists in their legislation of 1953. But it was less than the 
African unions were prepared to accept in 1944, and such a differentiation 
between the miners and other workers had serious consequences. The miners asked 
four times for ten shillings a shift and better conditions between April and 
August 1946, m d  were ignored by the Chamber. The strike of 74,000 African 
miners in August 1946, carefully timed to coincide with the opening of the NRC 
session, was the event which precipitated the crisis between the African 
leadership and the Smuts Government. 
meanwhile, as new inter-racial political movements gathered strength 
and the M C  spmuted its own more radical Youth ~eague, the Anti-Pass campaign 
was coming to a head. It had held a conference in the Gandhi Hall, Johamesbmg, 
on 20 April 1944, shortly after the abolition of passes had been moved by Donald 
Holteno in the Assembly. Xwna, who had been elected the csunpaiga chairman, 
tried to get an interview with Smuts, working throu& Mrs Ballinger, in order to 
present the conferencefs petition. But Smuts was off to San ~ancisco. The 
organizers then decided to accept Hofmeyr, but were rebuffed. Another anti-pass 
conference therefore met in the Gandhi Hall on 29 April 1945. Smuts declined 
another request by Xuma for an interview in September, on the ground that he was 
already considering representations by the NRC. A mass meeting to attack the 
pass system took pl.ace in Newtown, Johannesburg, in Xovember, while early in the 
new year the Reef Advisory Boards took the issue up, the Smuts Government all 
along appearing to do nothing. In fact, it did one important thing: it placed 
the pass laws on the agenda of the Fagan Commission into Native Laws, appointed 
in the middle of 1946. But, by not acting sooner, it allowed itself to be 
overtaken by events. 
The mineworkers struck on 12 August 1946, and the NRC reassembled 
on the l4th, each of its members having been asked by Xuma as President-General 
of the ANC and as chairman of the Anti-Pass Committee, on 26 July, to adjourn 
their session unless the Government agreed to abolish the pass laws, recognize 
African trade unions under the Industrial Conciliation Act, and repeal the 
oppressive sections of the Urban Areas Act and the sections of the Native 
Administration Act of 1927 which permitted banishment without trial. B e d  
Rodseth, opening the NRC session in the absence of Mears, who was investigating 
the strike, made no mention of the strike in his opening address, and had no 
information to give when pressed by members, though he did attach a lot of 
importance to the Fagan Commission, to which the ANC had already been asked to 
submit evidence. But the NRC reacted angrily. Dr Moroka, who in any case 
thought there was no substitute for direct representation in Parliament, moved 
the adjournment of the session with a motion which was antagonistic in tone and 
obviously intended to be so; and this was significant because the motion was 
supported unanimously by radicals, by moderate intellectuals, and even by chiefs. 
The Natives' Representatives immediately began pouring oil, 
Mrs Ballinger urging Matthews and Godlo to see that the November session met 
as usual, lest the "old man" outmanoeuvre the NRC by appointing others in their 
stead. Brookes wrote to his colleagues on the Native Affairs Commission and to 
Hofrneyr, urging then to consider a meaningful programme of reform and not take 
umbrage and stand on their dignity - as, indeed, Hofmeyr was inclined to do. 
Brookes thou&t that the constitution of the NRC needed fmdamental review, that 
it should be given an executive to facilitate negotiations, and that it should 
be given better accommodation and amenities, for indignities and inconveniences 
had helped to build up its explosive mood. But his proposals went a good deal 
-+ther: "Unless we are prepared to take seriously questions such as those of 
the Pass Laws, and new and irksome controls, and to make unequivocal declarations 
of policy in favour of free and compulsory primary education, and the 
strengthening of the status of the Representative Council, we shall be heading 
for disaster", he warned* He also wanted a judicial commission to investigate 
the miners' strike, which would have had the effect of removing it from public 
controversy, and the recognition of African trade unions on lines to be worked 
out by another commission "with two natives on it". 
Hofmeyr discounted Brookes's advics, telling Smuts, who was at the UN 
meeting in Paris, that he thou&t whites would look on such proposals as 
surrender. He preferred "a friendly and conciliatory but firm statement of 
government policy as at present f~llowed'~, which would attempt "the difficult 
task of relating our present frankly discriminatory policy with the 
expectations aroused in the native mind by the Atlantic Charter, the United 
Nations Charter, and your own (misunderstood) Capetown speech where you talked 
of the failure of segregationf1 (i.e. the 1942 speech). If linked with a 
declaration of intention to ??eco&ze African unions, Hofmeyr thought, this 
"might put us right in the eyes of the world" even if it did not satisfy the NRC. 
Smuts, however, saw something in Brookesfs proposal, and asked for a draft on 
the lines of Brookes~s plan to be approved by the Cabinet and sent to him, 
remarking that "our native policy would have to be liberalized at modest pace 
but public opinion has to be carried with us.... Practical social policy a w q  
from politics as stated by me still holds, is being carried out, and will be so 
more and more as finance permitsu. (with a crisis over Natal Indians looming up, 
Smuts was already beginning to find international pressures in Paris 
embarrras sing. ) 
At the Native Affairs Commission meeting on 27 September, Brookes was 
opposed by Smit who, like Hofmeyr, was ruffled by the tone of the NRC resolution 
and feared for the Government's public image. But the Commission did agree that 
Hofmeyr, as acting prime minister, rather than Van der Byl, the Minister of 
Native Affairs, should be asked to address the NRC. This had marked conciliatory 
implications, and Brookes hastened to warn Hofmeyr that to avoid a breakdown he 
would have to give the NRC llmore than a mere statement of government actions1': 
they needed something to look forward to. The form of Hofaeyrts statement was 
worked out in further correspondence between Smuts and Hofmeyr, who conferred 
with Van der Byl, Mears and Rodseth, and he read it to the Africans on 20 
November. 
Hofmeyr rejected the "violent and exaggerated statementsf1 of the August 
resolution and swept aside its demand for abolition of all discriminatory 
legislation as unrealistic. He then went on to expound the Smutsian maxim of 
gradual change and - fairly modestly - to list the good things that the 
Government had done for Africans. He talked of intentions to legislate for the 
recognition of Afx'ican unions Ifin conformity with the recommendations of the 
Lansdown Commissionf1, though it was "not proposed to provide for the recognition 
of a trade union for Native Mineworkers1!. But his statement had almost no 
reference to other aspects of future policy. In this respect, Brookes had been 
ignored; and for this Smuts, Hofmeyr, the Cabinet, and the Native Affairs 
Comisaion were all responsible. 
m e  NRC repiied on 26 November, repudiating the censure which Hofmeyr 
had delivered, accusing the Government of recklessness for having caused miners' 
deaths, and fin* the statement "Disappointing" because it llmade no attempt to 
deal with ... the Pass Laws, the colour bar in industry, the political rights of 
Non-Ekmope~s~~. It set the social reforms of the Government against the actual 
needs of the situation, found them all insufficient, and hammered the Government 
for not conceding collective bargaining rights to African workers, Finally, it 
wanted direct African representation at all levels from municipal councils to 
Parliament. 
Noheyr and Mears were clearly taken aback by this rejection, and 
rather weakly tried to persuade the NRC to remain in session to deal with 
important routine business. The Government now came under pressure from the 
Natives' Representatives as well. In January 1947 Mrs Ballinger was exasperated 
by Smutshssertion in the No Confidence debate that the 1936-37 native policy 
was still working well. She told Matthews not to let such a statement go 
unchallenged, and confided in Dr Bokwe of Middledrift that "the prime minister 
seems to have lost his head completelyt1. Smuts had read the NRCts rejection of 
Hofmeyrts statement of 2Q November as meaning that they would be satisfied with 
nothhg less than effective political power, which indeed they had actually said. 
He told Margaret Gillet on 7 February that "the Natives want ri&ts and not 
imp~ovements'~, and reacted in the sane way to M r s  Ballinger when she told him 
that the abolition of the pass laws and a promise of consultation could buy ten 
years: "But isn't it votes they want?I1 Yet he felt sufficiently encouraged by 
her words to ask her to send him a list of proposals for a new direction in 
native policy, which she proceeded to do "with an eye to what is politically 
possible and capable of argument in our political context". What she sent him 
was a document suggesting the recognition of permanent urban communities of 
Africans and their families, better training for increasingly scarce African farm 
workers, the gradual replacement of the pass laws by a better system of labour 
exchanges, a promise of meaningful consultation with the NRC, and extension of 
African representation in the municipal and provincial councils: llpractical 
social policy1', almost without politics, in fact. 
The Native Affairs Commission was accordingly sent into its tank. 
There it bmu&t out of storage a report of the NRCfs 1943 recess committee, 
which had originally been ignored, asking for minor changes within the 1936 
Representation Act - 2 more white senators, 7 more white representatives in the 
Assembly, and representatives in all provincial councils, all chosen by adult 
suffrage on a communal basis, and a larger NRC. But the Native Affairs 
Commission found even these outdated demands a little too extreme, and set about 
recasting the structure of African representation so as to avoid the extension 
of their political power vis-&-*S the white electorate. Thus it accepted the 
recess committeefs idea of an enlarged NRC, going back to fifty elected members 
as originally proposed by Hertzog in 1926. This enlarged NRC was to be made the 
apex of a new, integrated African representative system, resting on a structure 
of general, district and local councils as foreshadowed and partly developed 
under the Native Affairs Act of 1920 for rural areas, and on a properly 
constituted Urban Advisory Boards Congress for the urban areas. The NRC was to 
have an African chairmam, which would emphasize its status as a political rather 
than an administrative body; it was to be allowed to make by-laws subject to 
parliamentary disallowance, take over the levy of the general tax from the 
existing general councils, and have an executive committee whose members would 
hold individual p~rtfolios. The proposals suggest aa attempt to incorporate 
Brookesfs arguments for the restructuring of the NRC with the ideas currently 
voiced by Smit that if the NRC were to play a political role its constituency 
structure needed simplifying and its membership increasing, and that if Africans 
were to advance in self-government they needed greater administrative 
involvemsnt and, above all, experience in the running of public finance - 
sensible enough, but hardly sufficient concessions at a moment of political 
confrontation. 
Smuts put the proposals to Matthews and five other NRC members on 
8 Nay, repeated his argument of 1942 that influx control had failed, and told 
tnem that the Hertzog-inspired KRC of 1936 had also failed because it was 
"simply a debating chamber . . . a platform from which to express grievances". But 
rather than abolish it, as some urged, he wanted to give it "a measure of 
re~ponsibility~~ as a fully elected body. He did not mention the power of 
taxation which it had been proposed to give the NRC. He mentioned the proposed 
Advisory Boards Congress - but such a congress had met unofficially since 1929. 
He then explained that residential segregation in urban areas remained government 
policy, but that blacks and whites must continue to share a common economic 
system. Problems arising out of this relationship, notably the pass laws and. 
migrant labour, had been referred to the Fagan Commission. Smuts concluded by 
referring to trade unions, but was unable to go beyond what Hofmeyr had offered - 
segregated unions alone were to qualify for recognition, and there waa to be no 
recognition for the miners. Where his proposals were definite, they were hardly 
concessions. Where he appeared to have something to offer, he was unable as yet 
to say w M  it was. 
The reaction of the NRC and of other African leaders was one of unifom 
disappointment. The Councilfs adjournment continued. Smuts evidently 
contemplated recalling the NRC, but then decided rather to ignore them and made 
a press statement about his future intentions. Brookes took the trouble to 
caution h h  even at this stage against antagonizing the NRC leaders "so as to 
leave the door open for future discussions" - advice which Smuts took seriously, 
as was clear from his reaction to Malanfs attacks in the Assembly on 20 January 
1948: "Do not let us break off, but let us give them certain powers and see ... 
what use they will make of the executive powers that will be accorded to them.... 
We must not abolish the Council but go forward" - all this in spite of the fact 
that the NRC caucus had met in November 1947 and decided that they had nothing -to 
expect from the Government. 
On the African side too, however, there was a clear reluctance to 
hock the bridges down. Talk of boycotting NRC and Natives' Representatives 
elections had started early after the start of the crisis in August 1946, and 
had been strongly urged at a special ANC conference in October 1946. Lembede 
and Kotane of the .ME, Mosaka and Moroka of the NRC, and Basner among the 
Natives1 Representatives, all favoured this line. The ANC and NRC moderates, 
however, notably Xuma, Godlo and Matthews, were opposed, as were the other 
Eativesl Representatives. There were, that is, moderate forces on the African 
side with whom a government prepared to make concessions could probably have 
concluded a deal. The Governmentls question, as unanswerable now as it was 
then, is whether, given a settlement on, say, the lines argued by Margaret 
Ballinger in February 1947, the moderate African leadership could have held 
control over their rank and file. 
For Smuts, there was the problem, on the other side, of pre-election 
jitters blended with complacency within his own party. This had been apparent 
as early as March 1947, when S. J. Tighy, MP for Florida, Transvaal, told Smuts 
that the Nationalists had won a Wolmaransstad by-election by attacking the DPIs 
native and immigration policies, and that it was urgent to refer native policy 
to a commission of experts so as to remove it from the political arena. Three 
dis later, "OMrie" Oosthuizen, the Party Secretary, sent Smuts a draft brochure 
on "South Africa and the Governance of Natives and Coloured Racest1, a crudely 
unpoli~hed study in equivocation intended for both internal and domestic 
propaganda purposes but clearly most suited to the white internal market. 
3. W. Mushet, Smuts's Minister of Public Works, toured the north-eastern Cape in 
A~~gust, aid reported to Smuts that the colour question was the Partyfs 
"deadliest danger". Like Tighy, be urged that it be removed from current 
controversy and placed in the hands of what he disarmingly called a "quasi- 
scientific" body so as to "take the teeth out of the opposition propagandaf1: 
"The 'Swart Gevaart is like a veritable Atom Bomb. 
If the Opposition use it with maxima [sic] 
potential, anything can happen to us in every 
constituency I have visited." 
Smuts marked this passage for discussion with Hofmeyr. Whether to believe the 
prophets of doom or the optimists was a problem for the UP leaders, especially 
after the loss of Hottentots Holland by Sir de Villiers Graaff in January 1947. 
In April 1948, 0osthui.zen was supremely confident, sending Smts a report that 
in the Cape the UP was expected to win thirty-one safe seats and possibly twelve 
others, as against the thirty-four held at the time of dissolution. On the 
other hand, Louis KarovslQr of Johannesburg told Hofmeyr that unless it shook up 
its o r ~ z a t i o n  the UP would lose sixteen seats on the Rand - which it did, as 
he took the trouble to remind Smuts when the 1948 election was over. 
Government policies emerged, then, from a conflict of pressures. The 
Fagan Commission had the task of thinking them out. Appointed before the miners1 
strike to investigate the whole urban problem afresh, with special reference to 
the pass law8 and migrant labour, Fagan's aommission was also asked, in mid-stream, 
to produce a special report on the Moroka riots of August 1947. The Native Laws 
Report was ready by 19 February 1948, and the Moroka Report by 28 April. It is 
not difficult to see, in Fagants recommendations, a reflection at least of the 
kind of advice which Margaret Billinger had been giving Smuts in February 1947. 
His proposals for a Union-wide system of labour bureaux, which might eventually 
provide a substitute for influx control, can be traced, via IvIss Ballinger, back 
to the Smit Report. His proposals for the stabilization of African urban labour, 
which meant - as he stressed forcefully in the Momka Report - encouraging those 
who worked in the towns to bring their families with them, was likewise an idea 
which the Natives! Representatives had been pressing v e g  hard. Fagan did not 
think that the system of migrant labour could be legislated out of existence, o r  
stopped by administrative decree, any more than he thought stabilization of 
labour could be forced on employers. But he strongly urged that they be 
encouraged to experiment, for example, on the new OFS goldfields. At the same 
time, his recommendation that villages should be built in the Reserves for the 
concentrated settlement of the landless - though it was not developed, and could 
prove highly irresponsible unless coupled with close attention to the provision 
of work opportunities, as later Nationalist policies would clearly show - was an 
attempt to check the rate of African urbanization,which was too fast for the 
authorities to deal with. On the pass laws, Fagan was straagely equivocal, for 
he seemed both to want to preserve passes as a control device while at the same 
time wanting to make them attractive, &er the name of identity cards, to be 
voluntarily applied for, on account of the employment security which they were 
to provide. But at least he was trying to extend the line of thought started by 
Smit. The value of the Report in general lay not so much in its detailed 
proposals, for it was a short report and these could only be described as 
defective, as in the fact that it did propose a change of direction, as Smit 
had done in 1942. It represented the most considered view of which the combined 
thinking of the Smuts Ministry, prodded by the Natives' Representatives, were 
capable under conditions of extreme political stress. Published two years 
earlier, in time to enable the Government to put some of its ideas into practice, 
there was an outside chance that it might have changed the direction of South 
African policy; but, appearing so near the end of the Governmentls term, with 
none of its recommendations yet tested in practice or in public debate, it 
offered the electorate a liberal aspiration rather than a policy, and,if the 
choice for the voters was between aspirations, the Sauer Report of the 
Nationalists seemed to offer more security on more traditional lines. 
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